Analiza: Abordajul navei Mavi Marmara

Telefoanele dintre cancelariile tarilor importante s-au inrosit zilele astea dupa ce sase nave (numite “Gaza aid flotilla” de catre BBC), au fost interceptate de Marina Israeliana in apele internationale.

Ne-am propus sa analizam evenimentul strict din perspectiva tacticilor si tehnicilor folosite, fara comentarii de natura politica.

Mai intai faptele.

Pe 31 mai, sase nave care transportau activisti ai mai multor organizatii au incercat sa sparga blocada instituita de Marina Israeliana asupra Gazei. Trei nave ale Marinei Israeliene au interceptat “flotila” in apele internationale si au trimis echipe de abordaj pe toate cele sase nave. Pe 5 dintre cele 6 nave, abordajele au fost fara victime. Pe nava Mavi Marmara au existat insa ciocniri violente intre militarii israelieni si activistii islamici. Militantii islamici i-au atacat pe militarii israelieni si au ranit 7 dintre ei (dintre care 2 grav). In urma reactiei militarilor israelieni, 9 militanti si-au pierdut viata.

Nava- Mavi Marmara, Pavilion al Insulelor Comore, cumparata cu 800.000 $ de organizatia islamica turca İnsani Yardım Vakfı.

 

Observatii- Mavi Marmara este o nava de pasageri, o nava mare, foarte dificil de controlat de o echipa de abordaj.

Echipele care au executat abordajul provin din Shayetet 13, o unitate speciala apartinand Marinei Israeliene. Competenta fortelor pentru operatii speciale israeliene este unanim recunoscuta in lume. Militarii din unitatile speciale israeliene sunt profesionisti si temerari, calitati demonstrate in multe misiuni (cea mai cunoscuta fiind raidul de la Entebbe, raid in care murit fratele premierului Benjamin Netanyahu, Jonathan “Yoni” Netanyahu, pe atunci locotenent-colonel in unitatea speciala Sayeret Matkal).

In primul rand de ce a fost necesara o unitate speciala pentru abordaj?

Abordajul este aproximativ echivalentul opririi in trafic de catre Politia Rutiera. Se controleaza actele navei, uneori se verifica si incarcatura. Este o activitate de rutina in general.

Doar ca de multe ori pe mare lucrurile nu se desfasoara cu manusi. Intervin astfel conflicte.

O ciocnire nu tocmai prieteneasca dintre o fregata a Royal Navy si o nava a Pazei de Coasta islandeze, in “Razboiul Codului” (1973):

Alta  “ciocnire”  intre activistii-ecologisti si o nava japoneza (2009):

In anii ’80 comandourile marine franceze au abordat in mai multe randuri navele Greenpeace care se indreptau spre atolul Mururoa pentru a intrerupe experientele nucleare franceze.

Apoi a urmat evenimentul nefericit din Noua-Zeelanda cand un comando francez a scufundat “nava amiral” a Greenpeace, Rainbow Warrior. Un fotograf portughez si-a pierdut viata si o parte dintre membrii comandoului au fost arestati. Intre ei si o femeie.

Boardingul este de mai multe tipuri (“Utilizarea Fortelor pentru Operatii Speciale Navale in combaterea amenintarilor specifice inceputului de secol” de Colonel dr. Marius Dumitru Craciun, articol aparut in Gandirea Militara Romaneasca  nr. 6/2009):

Mavi Marmara a fost un caz de boarding ostil. Asadar  era necesara o unitate speciala.

In al doilea rand: de ce a fost aleasa Shayetet 13?

Sistemul israelian de unitati speciale este printre cele mai bine gandite sisteme din lume. Responsabilitatile sunt impartite intre IDF (Armata Israeliana), Politie, Politie de Frontiera (Magav) etc. Misiunile de interventie contraterorista si/sau salvare ostatici sunt executate in principal de trei unitati:

-Sayeret Matkal (care este subordonata Statului Major al IDF) se ocupa de interventiile din afara Israelului.

- Shayetet 13 (care este subordonata Marinei) se ocupa de interventiile care au loc pe apa (in principal in exteriorul tarii);

- Unit Yamam (care este subordonata Politiei de Frontiera) se ocupa de interventiile de pe teritoriul Israelului.

In afara de aceste unitati, exista si alte unitati care au ca a doua specializare inerventia contraterorista si mai exista o unitate de rezervisti in Eilat. Specializarea a doua inseamna ca aceste unitati au o dotare inferioara fata de cele 3 unitati de mai sus, iar militarii din cadrul lor petrec mai putin timp la antrenament avand si o experienta mai redusa in genul asta de misiuni. Este aproximativ ca in medicina: si un medic generalist poate opera in caz de nevoie, dar un medic specializat in chirurgie o face mai bine.

Acest sistem cu reguli si specializari clare a fost creat dupa cateva interventii partial reusite, in care si-au pierdut viata ostatici.

Deci Shayetet 13 a fost aleasa pentru ca este unitatea destinata sa intervina in cazurile de terorism pe mare, piraterie etc.

Pe 3 noiembrie 2009 unitatea a interceptat un transport de armament destinat Hezbollah, aflat la bordul unui cargou (500 tone).

Imagini din timpul unei misiuni in Liban :

Ce-nseamna interventie pe mare? O scurta recapitulare.

a. Interventie in cazuri de piraterie si luari de ostatici

Si in ultima vreme cazurile de genul asta sunt cele mai frecvente:

Pe  4 aprilie 2008, yachtul Le Ponant a fost “ocupat” de pirati somalezi. Ostaticii au fost eliberati pe 12 aprilie. Militarii francezi din comandourile marine au arestat sase dintre cei 12 pirati dupa ce i-au urmarit cu ajutorul elicopterelor.

Tot pe 4 aprilie, dar in 2009, piratii somalezi au ocupat un alt yacht francez, Tanit. in 9 aprilie militarii francezi din Comandoul Hubert au eliberat 4 dintre cei 5 ostatici. Unul dintre ostatici si-a gasit moartea in schimbul de focuri.

Dupa unele surse franceze, pe 30 noiembrie 2008 a existat si o operatiune esuata. Scafandrii de lupta din cadrul Centre parachutiste d’entrainement aux operations maritime (mai cunoscut sub denumirea Service Action) au incercat o actiune discreta de eliberare a ostaticilor de pe Yenegoa Ocean, o nava nigeriana sub pavilion panamez.

Pe 8 aprilie 2009, nava MV Maersk Alabama a fost ocupata de 4 pirati somalezi. Pe 12 aprilie lunetistii din cadrul Seal au eliminat trei dintre pirati, al patrulea fiind capturat in viata. Capitanul Phillips a fost eliberat nevatamat.

In afara de aceste cazuri, au existat o multime de cazuri mai putin mediatizate.

Pe 11 noiembrie 2008, echipele Fleet Protection Group, Royal Marines (Fleet Standby Rifle Troop) au ucis intr-un schimb de focuri doi pirati somalezi.

Fortele speciale olandeze (Unit Interventie Mariniers) si cele daneze (din cadrul Fromandskorpset), printre cele mai capabile in domeniul operatiilor maritime din cadrul NATO, au executat mai multe misiuni in largul coastelor Somaleze. Cele mai recente pe 5  aprilie, respectiv 5 si 28 februarie.

Imagini filmate intr-una dintre ele (din 5 aprilie 2010) au fost facute publice recent:

Imagini de la o misiune a militarilor danezi din 2008:

In paranteza fie spus, de multe ori s-a intamplat ca piratii sa fie eliberati dupa ce le-au fost confiscate armele. Rusii au gasit o solutie la aceasta problema.

Pe 6 mai 2010 forte speciale rusesti (probabil care apartin Flotei din Pacific, desi nu este exclusa si participarea Alpha) au eliberat petrolierul Moscow University. N-au fost victime printre ostatici. Zece dintre cei 11 pirati au fost capturati in viata si conform legilor internationale au fost eliberati intr-o barca gonflabila. Doar ca n-au mai ajuns niciodata la mal, dupa expresia oficialilor rusi “au disparut de pe radar” .

b. Interventie in cazuri de trafic de stupefiante, braconaj etc.

Una dintre cele mai mari operatiuni de acest fel se desfasoara in Caraibe si cuprinde unitati navale din Statele Unite, Canada, Marea Britanie, Olanda, Spania si Franta.

De exemplu pe 10 februarie 2009 echipa de abordaj a unei fregate franceze a descoperit 600 kg de cocaina la bordul unei ambarcatiuni.

De cativa ani traficantii folosesc inclusiv ambarcatiuni semi-submersibile pentru transportul drogurilor. Una dintre ele interceptata pe 15 ianuarie 2009 transporta 7 tone de cocaina.

Si Politia de Frontiera din Romania a avut fost nevoita sa intervina de cateva ori in special in cazul pescadoarelor turcesti care vin la braconaj.

“Două pescadoare turceşti au fost reţinute pentru braconaj pe 2 aprilie, poliţiştii de frontieră fiind nevoiţi să tragă focuri de armă pentru a opri una dintre nave. Primul vas a fost depistat aseară, în jurul orei 18.30, la 60 de mile travers de Sfântu Gheorghe. Pescadorul a fost abordat de oamenii legii, care au identificat la bord 14 marinari turci, fără acte de identitate la ei.

Comandantul vasului le-a spus poliţiştilor români că nava este înregistrată în Ucraina, dar că nu are documentele la el. Al doilea vas a fost depistat spre dimineaţă, în jurul orei 5.00, la 66 mile travers de localitatea 23 August. Echipajul nu s-a supus controlului oamenilor legii, astfel că aceştia au lansat o rachetă de semnalizare şi au tras 15 focuri de manevră. Într-un final nava s-a oprit, iar poliţiştii au urcat la bord, unde au găsit plase şi gheaţă. „A fost o misiune desfăşurată de Grupul de Nave cu sprijinul SCOMAR”, a precizat comisar-şef Adrian Burcea, purtătorul de cuvânt al Inspectoratului Judeţean al Poliţiei de Frontieră Constanţa. Navele au fost escortate în portul Constanţa, iar cei 20 de marinari ce formează echipajele pescadoarelor sunt cercetaţi pentru pescuit illegal.” Romania Libera

In apele internationale abordajul se face dupa urmatoarele prevederi ale legislatiei internationale (Col. dr. Craciun):

Si in punctul asta este cazul sa ne intoarcem la oile noastre, abordajul navei Mavi Marmara. A fost o operatiune legala.

“Under international law, the consensus of the maritime attorney’s I have spoken to is that the boarding operation by Israel was legal. The coast of Gaza has been under maritime blockade by Israel, a blockade that was well known – indeed running the maritime blockade for political purposes was the specific intent of the protesters. It is why the press had been reporting all week that the situation was likely leading towards a confrontation. Is anyone surprised that Israel had an established maritime blockade and enforced that maritime blockade? I’m certainly not, Israel made clear all week that the flotilla would not be allowed to pass.

The maritime blockade is a result of the war between Israel and Hamas. Ones political position on that ongoing war is completely irrelevant to the reality that the maritime blockade was established. Knowledge of the maritime blockade by the protesters is also not in debate, and neither is knowledge the flotilla intended to violate the blockade – they made this clear themselves in the press. Once the flotilla made it clear in the press they intended to run the maritime blockade, according to international law, and even US law, the flotilla was considered to be in breach by attempting to violate the blockade.

It was at that point the IDF had legal authority – under international maritime law governing maritime blockades during wartime – to board the vessels and prevent the vessels from running the blockade. Yes, this action may legally be taken in international waters if those waters are recognized as part of the area under the maritime blockade. It is important to note that the action took place within the zone that was publicly known to be part of the maritime blockade of Gaza, and part of that zone is in international waters.” Information Dissemination

Fireste, in domeniul interpretarii legilor va exista intotdeauna cate cineva care sa conteste realitatea.

Sunt doua categorii de probleme pe care o sa le abordez :

1. operatiunea desfasurata de Shayetet 13;

2. operatiunea media de influentare a opiniei publice mondiale.

1. Interventiile pe apa sunt extrem de dificile. Necesita o logistica pe care nu multe tari o au. Interventiile de mai sus poate par nespectaculoase, dar in cazul a trei dintre ele (Ponant, Tanit, Alabama) echipele au fost parasutate in mare dupa zboruri lungi si recuperate apoi de nave aflate la fata locului. Au existat de asemenea acolo nave dotate cu elicoptere; drone, avioane de patrulare maritima etc.

Exista mai multi factori care contribuie la reusita unei misiuni. In primul rand informatiile de la fata locului.

Apoi exista factori care pot fi sintetizati pe scurt : Speed-Aggression-Surprise.

Deci cu alte cuvinte, rapiditatea de actiune si violenta “paralizeaza” reactiile adversarilor. Abordajul se face si cu ajutorul elicopterului dar si cu barcile. Cateva fotografii de la un exercitiu NATO desfasurat la Constanta pentru a ilustra secventele:

-insertia in ascuns a scafandrilor GNFOS

- echipa SRI coboara pe franghie

- militari americani din cadrul SEAL sosesc intr-o RHIB

Fotografii cu militarii DIR  (exercitiul Blue Road 2004):

Imagini cu GSPI Acvila, una dintre cele mai bune unitati speciale din Romania (din pacate desfiintata din cauza ca “stricau ploile” in sectorul 5):

In cazul de fata, au existat cateva probleme.

Militarii au fost surprinsi de o “primire” asa de organizata, asta insemnand un minus la capitolul  informatii:

“We did not expect such resistance from the group’s activists as we were talking about a humanitarian aid group,” the boarding party’s commander, an unnamed naval lieutenant who received special permission to be interviewed, told Army Radio.

Apropierea cu elicopterul a fost ca sa folosesc un termen din fotbal- “telefonata”, astfel incat activistii erau deja alertati.

In momentul in care primii militari israelieni au coboarat pe parama (momentul in care echipa este extrem de vulnerabila) activistii au sarit literalmente pe ei.

Dupa cum a ilustrat sugestiv Andrew Exum situatia:

Militarii israelieni erau inarmati cu arme de paintball. Initial am crezut ca au fost FN 303:

Dar din imagini rezulta ca au folosit asa-numitele “paintball marker” care se utilizeaza in general pentru a marca participantii agresivi la demonstratii pentru a fi mai usor identificati si aretati.

L.E. -Este posibil sa fi avut si asa ceva:

Imagini difuzate de IDF:

Activisti pentru pace islamici:

Am tot auzit zilele astea intrebari de genul “cum, astia care manaca krav maga pe paine au luat bataie de la niste civili?”

Probabil orice unitate aflata in situatia aia ar fi patit la fel. Unitatile speciale nu sunt formate din batausi. Exista multe ore de antrenament in materie de autoaparare, dar accentul se pune in mod diferit, in functie de specializare.

In tari ca Uniunea Sovietica si China (si de-acolo au venit influente negative si-n Romania) era la mare moda spartul de caramizi. Unitatile speciale din Occident (inclusiv din Israel) utilizeaza artele martiale (si aici nu ma refer la cele care pun accentul pe arme albe, eskrima de exemplu) pentru a putea supravietui (in primul rand), pentru imobilizari etc. Nu pentru a omora adversarii cu mainile goale. Pentru asta exista armele.

Krav maga permite supravietuirea in cazul in care militarii sunt atacati de mai multi agresori. Si din punctul asta de vedere, militarii au fost bine instruiti. Sigur, Chuck Norris poate ii dovedea singur pe activisti .

Exista unitati in Israel mult mai bine pregatite in materie de “riot control” (de exemplu Force 100 a Politiei Militare).

De asemenea cei de la Shayetet 13 au fost extrem de slab dotati in materie de armament neletal : fara bastoane telescopice, fara tomfa, fara taser, fara…

Si am ajuns la o alta problema: o misiune de abordaj s-a transformat intr-una de riot control.

2. Acum mai multi ani David Kilcullen a scris un memo despre contrinsurgenta in care a subliniat mai multe puncte dintre care redau trei care se potrivesc situatiei de fata:

“18. Remember the global audience. One of the biggest differences between the counterinsurgencies our fathers fought and those we face today is the omnipresence of globalized media. Most houses in Iraq have one or more satellite dishes. Web bloggers, print, radio and television reporters and others are monitoring and reporting your every move. When the insurgents ambush your patrols or set off a car
bomb, they do so not to destroy one more track, but because they want graphic images of a burning vehicle and dead bodies for the evening news. Beware the “scripted enemy”, who plays to a
global audience and seeks to defeat you on the court of global public opinion. You counter this by training people to always bear in mind the global audience, assume that everything they say or do will be
publicized, and befriend the media. Get the press on-side: help them get their story, and trade information with them. Good relationships with non-embedded media—especially indigenous media—
dramatically increase your situational awareness, and help get your message across to the global and local audience.

21. Exploit a “single narrative.” Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized.In most societies there are opinionmakers: local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence—including the pernicious influence of the insurgents—often takes the form of a “single narrative.” This is a simple, unifying, easily-expressed story or explanation that organizes people’s experience and provides a framework for understanding events. Nationalist and ethnic historical myths, or sectarian
creeds, provide such a narrative. The Iraqi insurgents have one, as do al-Qaida and the Taliban. To undercut their influence you must exploit an alternative narrative: or better yet, tap into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents.This narrative is often worked out for you by higher headquarters—but only you have the detailed knowledge to tailor the narrative to local conditions and generate leverage from it. For example, you might use a nationalist narrative to marginalize foreign fighters in your area, or a narrative of national redemption to undermine former regime elements that have been terrorizing the population. At the company level, you do this in baby steps, by getting to know local opinion-makers, winning their trust, learning what motivates them and building on this to find a single narrative that emphasizes the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate success. This is art, not science.

25. Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces. At this stage, if things are proceeding well, the insurgents will go over to the offensive. Yes, the offensive—because you have created an situation so dangerous to the insurgents, by threatening to displace them from the environment, that they have to attack you and the population to get back into the game. Thus it is normal, even in the most successful operations, to have spikes of
offensive insurgent activity late in the campaign. This does not necessarily mean you have done something wrong (though it may: it depends on whether you have successfully mobilized the population). At this point the tendency is to go for the jugular and seek to destroy the enemy’s forces in open battle. This is rarely the best choice at company level, because provoking major combat usually plays into the enemy’s hands by undermining the population’s confidence. Instead, attack the enemy’s strategy: if he is seeking to recapture the allegiance of a segment of the local population, then coopt them against him. If he is trying to provoke a sectarian conflict, go over to “peace enforcement mode.” The permutations are endless but the principle is the same: fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces.”

Cunosc israelienii aceste reguli ? Evident. Au tinut cont de ele in cazul de fata? Aparent nu.

In ziua de azi, mult mai importanta decat realitatea este perceptia publicului asupra evenimentelor.

Multi bloggeri americani influenti (cu serioasa experienta militara) au criticat actiunea israeliana din punct de vedere al comunicarii/Information Operations.

Andrew Exum :

“If I am in charge of doing that for the Israeli Navy, I am going to assume these people are smart and are deliberately trying to provoke a crazy response from my sailors and soldiers that will produce ready-for-television images that both isolate Israel within the international community and further raise the ire of the Arabic-speaking and Islamic worlds. I mean, that is my base assumption for what this group is trying to do. So naturally, the last thing I would want my forces to do would be to overreact, right? It’s like when your convoy gets fired on inside a crowded market: the last thing you want to do is return fire with 7.62mm, killing a bunch of civilians and giving the enemy exactly the effect he was looking for.

If something does go wrong, meanwhile, I am going to have a response ready. I am going to have my very best spokespersons on international and Israeli television. I am most certainly not going to let people like Danny Ayalon provide my government’s response, right? Because a live wire like Ayalon — who the Turks already hate, with an understandable passion — will just say something incredibly crazy like how the people in the aid flotilla were terrorists with ties to al-Qaeda. (Even if you can prove this is somehow true, everyone you need to be speaking to right now — the international community, the Turkish people, the Arabic-speaking world — is just going to think you are nuts for saying it or will roll their eyes and say, “Oh, of course he’s saying that.”)

In reality, what happened today is the Israelis got their butts handed to them. The Israeli response to this aid flotilla was a fabulous gift to Hamas and Iran.”

Zenpundit

“Taking stock of this bit of guerrilla theater gone lethal, let’s see what the supporters of HAMAS terrorism gained:

• The world is hearing a false narrative that Israel massacred unarmed peace activists.
• Turkey’s ruling, authoritarian, crypto-Islamist Party has a further wedge to downgrade Turkey’s traditional military cooperation with Israel while putting political pressure on Turkish secularists and Army leaders.
• Israel’s diplomatic isolation is greatly increased
• Additional strain is put on the already lukewarm relationship between the Obama administration and the Netanyahu government

On the moral level of war, HAMAS supporters – whose strategic objective is to end Israel’s blockade of Gaza, so that HAMAS can rebuild it’s military strength – have scored a solid triumph while the IDF have acted with all the instinctive propensity for causing self-inflicted wounds of Richard Nixon confronting the Watergate break-in.”

George Friedman (Stratfor):

“Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon charged that the mission was simply an attempt to provoke the Israelis. That was certainly the case. The mission was designed to demonstrate that the Israelis were unreasonable and brutal. The hope was that Israel would be provoked to extreme action, further alienating Israel from the global community and possibly driving a wedge between Israel and the United States. The operation’s planners also hoped this would trigger a political crisis in Israel.

A logical Israeli response would have been avoiding falling into the provocation trap and suffering the political repercussions the Turkish NGO was trying to trigger. Instead, the Israelis decided to make a show of force. The Israelis appear to have reasoned that backing down would demonstrate weakness and encourage further flotillas to Gaza, unraveling the Israeli position vis-à-vis Hamas. In this thinking, a violent interception was a superior strategy to accommodation regardless of political consequences. Thus, the Israelis accepted the bait and were provoked.

(…)The tougher Israel is, the more the flotilla’s narrative takes hold. As the Zionists knew in 1947 and the Palestinians are learning, controlling public opinion requires subtlety, a selective narrative and cynicism. As they also knew, losing the battle can be catastrophic. It cost Britain the Mandate and allowed Israel to survive. Israel’s enemies are now turning the tables. This maneuver was far more effective than suicide bombings or the Intifada in challenging Israel’s public perception and therefore its geopolitical position (though if the Palestinians return to some of their more distasteful tactics like suicide bombing, the Turkish strategy of portraying Israel as the instigator of violence will be undermined).”

Fabius Maximus :

“As I wrote 3 years ago, America has made many geopolitical mistakes, some very serious.  Nothing critical for a superpower, so long as we do not make too many.  But Israel operates far closer to the edge.   Small, geographically and economically vulnerable, surrounded by enemies, and heir to millennia of western antisemitism (Passages from Luther’s On the Jews and Their Lies could be read with applause at some American universities).  This insecurity makes them more likely to take bold gambles — and increases the odds of mistakes having horrible consequences.  They may have just made a big mistake, with potentially horrible consequences.”

Noah Shachtman (Danger Room):

“But no one — not even the Israeli military — seems to think it’ll make much of a difference in the international tide of ill will following the raid. ”We know one thing for sure, in the media we are going to lose the war anyhow,” Shlomo Dror, a spokesman for Israel’s Defense Ministry, told the Christian Science Monitor. “It doesn’t matter what we do.”

Dror made those comments on May 28 — days before those commandos stormed the Free Gaza flotilla. Israel gave up on the information war before it even started.

The IDF has been practicing a willful indifference to global opinion for years. After the Hezbollah war of 2006, it decided that sensitivity to outside perception made its forces too hesitant, and put lives on both sides at risk. So in its 2009 Gaza campaign, the IDF decided to do the exact opposite: Shut out the international press, and fight without restraint and without a care about what anyone else thought.

The IDF did embed camera crews in its combat units, but they were there to defend troops against accusations of war crimes. Meanwhile, a young Israeli soldier — born in a small town in Hawaii, and converted to Judaism at Yale — got together with another American Israeli who thought it’d be cool to share some of those videos online. That became the IDF’s official YouTube channel, unexpectedly generating millions and millions of views. But social media (and information operations, generally) remained on the periphery of Israeli planning.

Just look at the heavy-handed, tone-deaf response to the “Free Gaza” ships. “The IDF had hoped to obtain a complete media blackout and planned to jam the signals from the Mavi Marmara,” the Jerusalem Post reports. “This did not work and the cameras on the boat successfully transmitted images throughout most of the takeover and enabled the activists to get their message out about the Israeli ‘aggression.’”

Cdr. Salamander:

“In the Long War, as I still call it, no one has been engaged with the enemy longer than Israel. If faced with their situation, Israel shows restraint few other nations would. They voluntarily gave up land – their strategic depth – in order to get peace; peace that they do not yet have.

They have to abide by rules that their enemy does not. Their enemy’s INFO OPS and PSYOPS are very good and assisted by a willing international community and still broad anti-Jewish bias in Europe – especially in the media and academia.”

The Corner:

“The fundamental deception here is the use of the word “humanitarian.” . . . Humanitarians don’t wield iron clubs, and [they] would have killed the Israelis had the Israelis not drawn their pistols in self-defense.

But there‘s a larger issue here. What exactly is the humanitarian crisis that the flotilla was actually addressing? There is none. There’s no one starving in Gaza. The Gazans have been supplied with food and social services, education, by the U.N., by UNWRA, for 60 years, in part with American tax money.

Second, when there are humanitarian needs, the Israelis allow — every day — food and medicine overland into Gaza. The reason that it did not want to allow this flotilla is because, as the spokesman for the flotilla said herself, this was not about humanitarian relief. It was about breaking the blockade.

And the reason the Israelis have a blockade is because they only want to allow humanitarian supplies and not weaponry. Look, the proof of that is the fact that if you look at a map of Gaza, you’ll see that Israelis only control three sides of this rectangle. There’s a fourth side on the Egyptian side. So it is an Egyptian-Israeli blockade.”

Information Dissemination:

“My impression is that this does represent a strategic blunder by Israel, but there is a cynical alternative that does merit mentioning. It has been suggested that further isolation of Israel by the United States would give greater flexibility to Israel for undertaking unilateral military action by Israel against Iran. That isolation would need to be more than just the NPT discussions that force Israel to disclose their nuclear arsenal, and more than just a diplomatic disagreement regarding the use of UN sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. This event would seem to be in line with creating additional political separation between Israel and the US needed for Israel to act unilaterally. Time will tell, but a brute force response to the second flotilla could easily give President Obama the flexibility he needs to create additional political separation from Israel on the US end.

I’m not really a subscriber of this point of view, but I do agree further political separation between Israel and the US right now would give Israel more flexibility to unilaterally attack Iran, and as the Danger Room article notes – Israel went into this flotilla operation understanding the infowar unfolding. Israel never plays expecting to lose something for nothing, suggesting something bigger may be at work here.”

NightWatch:

“Comment: NightWatch assesses that US diplomacy for a Middle East peace plan is the actual target of the Israeli naval action. Israel has just demonstrated that the US cannot control Israel, undermining any confidence Arab countries place in US promises relating to Israeli behavior. Israel refuses to be bound by US promises.

The timing of the Israeli action appears related to the unprecedented US position of supporting what Israeli leaders consider a hostile resolution in preparation for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review, due in 2012. According to the analysis of The Jerusalem Post, the US was willing to sign the resolution in exchange for broad support for new sanctions against Iran. Ironically, today, Iran issued a statement supporting the resolution!”

In materie de influentare exista doua tipuri de actiuni:

- actiuni destinate influentarii maselor/opiniei publice (strategie indirecta pentru ca influenteaza factorii de decizie in mod indirect);

- actiuni de influentare a factorilor de decizie (strategie directa).

Acum, daca voi credeti ca primul ministru Benjamin Netanyahu si ministrul apararii Ehud Barak (ambii fosti ofiteri in Sayeret Matkal) sunt niste novici care nu-si gandesc miscarile cu 10 mutari inainte, e treaba voastra. Eu nu cred asta.

Israelul a sacrificat influentarea opiniei publice pentru a realiza influentarea factorilor de decizie. Au facut un sacrificiu tactic pentru a castiga din punct de vedere strategic.

Bottom line: Israelul nu va pierde nici razboiul mediatic al perceptiilor, nici pe cel diplomatic.

“May Israel survive or must all of us here pack up our belongings and go back to our former countries and strat over agia? Maybe you would prefer us to take a piece of Central Africa? Or Uruguay? not Egypt, thank you, we tried it once and it wasn’t a success. Or shall we redisperse ourselves over ghettos of Europe and Asia while we wait for the next pogrom? What do you say Charlie?’

‘I just want you to leave the poor bloody Arabs alone, ‘ she said, parrying again.

‘Great. And how do we do that specifically?’

‘Stop bombing their camps. Driving them off their land. Bulldozering their villages. Torturing them.’

‘Ever look at a map of the Middle East?’

‘Of course I have.’

‘And when you looked at the map, did you once wish the Arabs would leave us alone?’ “

John Le Carre – The little drummer girl

(articolul e draft 0, e posibil sa fie editat/actualizat in continuare)

Cititi si ce scriu Alin Fumurescu, Dragos Nicolae si Iulia Gheorghe.